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The Cammacks reaffirm all arguments as set forth in the Brief of Appellant, and 
furthermore, address the specifics of the Brief of Appellee as follows: 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT A: 
Mr. Harbaugh contends that the Cammack's issues should not be considered 
becausethey were not raised at the juvenile court level. Brief of Appellee, page 10. Mr. 
Harbaugh's contention misleads the court. All issues were adequately preserved at the 
lower level court, and citations to the record are given in Appellee's Brief, page 9-12. 
Mr. Harbaugh argues that the Cammacks "have not alleged that a plain error was 
made by Judge Lindley" in relation to the issues. Brief of Appellee, page 11. He also 
alleges that the Cammacks have not established that error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, and that the Cammacks have not alleged that the error was harmful. Id. On 
the contrary, the Cammacks have stated, "the juvenile court made an error of law and 
must be reversed." Brief of Appellant, page 23. The Cammacks have also alleged that 
the trial court made a conclusion that the Cammack's Petition for Protective Order was 
"unsubstantiated," and that the trial court then made an award of attorney's fees as if it 
had exonerated Mr. Harbaugh. Brief of Appellee, page 23-7. The trial court did not 
understand the difference between "unsubstantiated" and "without merit." This 
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difference is stated in UTAH CODE ANN § 62A-4a-101, and should have been obvious to 
all involved. A petition cannot be both "unsubstantiated" ("unsupported") and also 
"without merit" (exoneration for the defendant). The Cammack's, being ordered to pay 
over $20,000 in attorney's fees and costs for a protective order action, have certainly 
established the harmfulness of the error. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE ARGUMENT C: 
Mr. Harbaugh claims that "Judge Lindley found the allegations of abuse in this 
case to be 'without merit' for purposes of imposing attorney's fees under Rule 37(d)." 
Brief of Appellee, page 12. Mr. Harbaugh completely ignores the facts that Judge 
Lindley, in one hand, states that the protective order was denied due to "insufficiency of 
the evidence presented," and in the other hand states that the fees are only allowed "if the 
Court finds the petition is without merit." Brief of Appellee, page 13, citing Judge 
Lindley's Findings and Order Regarding Order to Show Cause and Request for 
Attorney's Fees, Rec. 365-366. Mr. Harbaugh has not directed the Appellate Court to any 
instance where the juvenile court made a finding that the protective order was "without 
merit." The only findings that were made, were that the protective order was 
"unsubstantiated." Fees are not allowed for "unsubstantiated" protective orders. They 
are only allowed for "without merit" protective orders. The court's written findings were 
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conflicting and in error. 
Mr. Harbaugh argues that this court should "assume" that Judge Lindley made a 
"without merit" finding because there is no transcript from the first hearing. Brief of 
Appellee, page 14. A transcript from the first hearing is not necessary. We have the 
minutes of the first hearing, which plainly state that "[t]he Court finds that there has not 
been sufficient evidence to prove that by a preponderance of the evidence the child has 
been abused or is in imminent threat of being abused." Rec. at 365. Why should the 
Appellate Court "assume" that the juvenile court would make a oral finding in direct 
contradiction of the Court Minutes? The Appellate Court should not make such an 
assumption, as suggested by Mr. Harbaugh. If the Appellate Court should assume 
anything, it should assume that findings were made that were consistent with the 
conclusion that the protective order was "unsubstantiated." 
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT D, E: 
Mr. Harbaugh argues that the Cammacks have not "marshaled the evidence in 
support of Judge Lindleyi's finding that the allegations of abuse were without merit." 
Brief of Appellee, page 16. In response, the Cammacks state as follows: 
First, Judge Lindley did not make a "finding" of fact that the allegations of abuse 
were "without merit." There is no place in the record that comes even close to such a 
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finding. 
Second, Judge Lindley did not make a "conclusion of law" that the petition was 
"without merit." Judge Lindleyi did make a finding that there was "insufficient 
evidence," which is the equivalent of an "unsubstantiated" conclusion. 
Third, even if there was a "conclusion of law" that the petition was without merit, 
the requirement of marshaling evidence in support of an appeal only applies to challenges 
of factual findings, not to conclusions of law. Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193 (Utah 
2000).1 
Fourth, the Cammacks have adequately marshaled the evidence. The Cammacks 
have produced the Minutes from the October 20, 2006 hearing and have produced the 
transcript from the December 4, 2006 hearing. 
Fifth, the court did indeed, after hearing the evidence, make a conclusion of law, 
JSee also Anderson v. Doms, 1999 P.2d 392 (1999 UT App. 207), certiorari denied 
994 P.2d 1271 (Appellant was relieved of his burden to marshal evidence by reason of 
inadequacy of trial court's findings, which were unsupported in record or did not support 
ultimate conclusion on issue of laches.); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah 
1995) (Appellants need not marshals all evidence supporting findings in action tried upon 
facts without jury or advisory jury in order to challenge findings on appeal, if they can 
demonstrate that findings as framed by court are legally insufficient.); Woodward v. 
Fazzio 823 P.2d 474 (Utah 1991) (Appellant need not go through the futile exercise of 
marshaling evidence when findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully 
challenged as factual determinations; appellant can simply argue the legal insufficiency of 
the findings as framed.) 
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that the Cammack Petition was "unsupported" or "unsubstantiated" (Rec. at 259), and the 
court later acknowledged and reaffirmed the same conclusion that the petition was 
"unsupported" or "unsubstantiated." See Rec. at 365-6. The Cammacks do not dispute 
this conclusion of law. Again, the marshaling requirement is not required when a legal 
conclusion is at issue. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193. 
Despite that the Cammacks are not disputing any "findings of fact," (on the issue 
of whether the petition was "without merit") since there were no "findings of fact" made, 
Mr. Harbaugh has, on pages 18-23 of his brief, outlined "assertions, proffers of 
testimony, and arguments." Brief of Appellee at 18. This is problematic because, the 
information provided in these pages was not presented at the October 20, 2006 hearing, 
when the court determined the petition to be "unsupported." It was presented at the 
December 4, 2006 hearing, wherein the only issues were the Order to Show Cause and the 
Attorney's Fees. The court had already made the conclusion at the October 20, 2006 
hearing that the petition was "unsupported" or "unsubstantiated." And the court, in its 
Findings and Order Regarding Order to Show Cause and Request for Attorney's Fees did 
not overturn its prior conclusion of "unsupported," but it reaffirmed the "unsubstantiated" 
determination by stating that the protective order was dismissed due to the "insufficiency 
of the evidence presented." Rec. at 365-6. 
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CONCLUSION 
The juvenile court erred when it found that the petition was "unsupported," but 
then awarded attorney's fees and costs as if the petition had been "without merit." The 
juvenile court never exonerated Mr. Harbaugh. One of the most integral parts of the 
Cammack's argument, is the difference between these two terms, which is found in UTAH 
CODE ANN § 62A-4a-101. Nowhere in Mr. Harbaugh's brief, does he address this 
problem, and nowhere does he explain how the juvenile court made a conclusion that the 
petition was "unsupported," and then can make a harmonious decision that the petition is 
"without merit." The Cammacks respectfully plead that the Appellate Court reverse this 
erroneous ruling. 
DATED this of January, 2008. 
HEATHER M. JENSEN, P.C. 
4 
Heather M. Jensen 
Attorney for Appellants/Petitioners 
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